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Abstract 
 
A central tool of the European Union (EU) to promote the democratization of 
post-communist Europe have been the conditions it has attached to the offer of 
accession. Yet EU’s influence varies across countries, and over time between 
the periods before and after accession. A key factor limiting the EU’s 
democratizing impact are domestic costs of complying with the EU’s 
conditionality:  the more governments rely on illiberal and undemocratic means 
to maintain power, the less influence the EU has.  Moreover, even if the 
domestic adjustment costs are not prohibitively high, for EU conditionality to 
bring about, or lock in democratic change, the positive and negative incentives 
relating to the benefits of EU membership have to be credible.  The limited 
credibility of sanctions against backsliding in new members and of the reward 
of accession for current candidate countries in Southeastern Europe is a key 
explanation for the setback in the EU’s democratizing role during this decade.   
 
 
A distinctive feature of the democratic transition in Central and 
Southeastern Europe after 1989 has been its close link to the process of 
accession to the European Union (EU).  The first wave of post-communist 
transition studies did not focus much on this characteristic of the process of 
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democratization in East Central Europe (ECE).  Instead, analyses focused 
predominantly on domestic factors to explain its outcome.1 From the early 
2000s, the literature has studied much more explicitly the role of international 
organizations, and of the EU in particular.2  By now, the effects of the EU on 
democratization in post-communist Europe are certainly no longer ‘a topic that 
remains mostly unexplored.’3  
And indeed, it is largely undisputed that the EU can potentially have a 
tremendous influence on post-communist transition.  Here are two very 
different striking examples, albeit not directly with regard to democratization:  
the first, concerning a highly sensitive question of statehood, is the EU’s 
ability to compel the Montenegrin leadership to set the threshold for the 
success of the referendum on independence at 55 percent, rather than 50 
percent.  Another often cited example is the June 1999 session of the 
Hungarian parliament that passed 152 of 180 laws without any debate since 
they concerned EU legislation.4  The literature broadly agrees that the main 
tool through which the EU exercises this influence on domestic politics is 
through accession conditionality.5  
However, we have to be careful not to overstate the power of 
conditionality and the EU’s actual impact on democratization.6  First, while the 
EU’s influence on post-communist democratization was arguably strongest in 
the period up to the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, even during this period, 
its causal impact varied across countries, issues and over time.  The main 
question for this chapter is therefore: how can we explain this variation in the 
EU’s influence on democratization?  Second, and more specifically, the EU’s 
ability to influence candidate countries may not be easily replicable among the 
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countries in Southeastern Europe (SEE) that have applied for EU 
membership.  Despite initial improvements in the quality of democracy and 
the rule of law in SEE, there is stagnation and there is even a deterioration of 
democracy.  How can we explain the apparent differences between accession 
candidates in ECE and SEE?  Third, political developments in ECE during this 
decade raise questions about the enduring ability of the EU to influence 
democratization through its enlargement process.  Signs of democratic 
‘backsliding’ among the EU’s post-communist new member states suggest 
that the EU’s democratizing impact may not be sustainable after accession, 
when challenged by illiberal national governments.  What is then the scope for 
the EU to redress backsliding among its membership once it has occurred?  
This chapter discusses in turn each of these questions about the scope 
and limit of EU influence on democratization in Central and Southeastern 
Europe.  It starts with an overview of the instruments through which the EU 
promotes democracy in its European neighborhood and identifies political 
conditionality, linked to the incentive of membership, as the most powerful 
instrument.  Drawing on the vast literature about EU conditionality and 
Europeanization in Central and Southeastern Europe, it suggests that a key 
factor limiting the EU’s democratizing impact are domestic adjustment costs to 
the EU’s conditionality:  the more governments rely on illiberal and 
undemocratic means to maintain power, the less influence the EU has.  
Moreover, even if the domestic adjustment costs are not prohibitively high, for 
EU conditionality to bring about, or lock in democratic change, the positive 
and negative incentives relating to the benefits of EU membership have to be 
credible.  The limited credibility of sanctions against backsliding in new 
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members and of the reward of accession for current candidate countries in 
SEE is a key explanation for the setback in the EU’s democratizing role during 
this decade.   
 
Accession conditionality as the main EU instrument for democracy 
promotion in post-communist Europe 
The EU has a range of instruments through which it can promote 
democracy.  Many of these instruments were specifically developed in the 
context of supporting democratic transition in post-communist Europe.  They 
include financial support for activities that foster democracy such as the 1992 
PHARE (Pologne Hongrie: aide à la restructuration économique) ‘Democracy 
Program’ that provided funding for civil society organizations that engaged in 
activities to promote an inclusive, pluralist, and participatory political culture, 
and since 1994, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.  
The most important instrument of the EU to promote democracy in European 
non-member states is its political conditionality.  Conditionality consists of 
offering target states certain rewards for their compliance with specific 
conditions, such as democratic principles or human rights.  The conditional 
benefits that the EU offers as rewards include:  financial assistance and aid, 
such as the PHARE program; market access, for example through association 
agreements; and full membership in the EU.  EU membership is the most 
powerful reward that the EU can offer for compliance with its conditions.   
The EU’s founding treaties specify only one condition that a state had 
to fulfill in order to apply for membership:  it had to be European.  The EU 
made the first reference to political membership conditions in the context of its 
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Mediterranean enlargements.  Elements of a democratic conditionality were 
visible in the EU’s rejection of an application by General Franco’s Spain for an 
association agreement in 1962, or the freezing of the association agreement 
with Greece in 1967 following the Colonels’ coup.7  The most explicit 
statement of the political conditions of EU membership was the Declaration on 
Democracy adopted at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1978.  It 
confirmed that ”respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and 
human rights in each Member State are essential elements of membership.”8  
Although the occasion for the declaration was the impending first direct 
election to the European Parliament, it was also intended to provide the EU 
with a safeguard in case the candidate countries might revert to authoritarian 
rule after obtaining membership.9  The risk of return of authoritarianism was 
then arguably more salient in ECE than later as there was no dramatic 
challenge to democratic consolidation similar to the attempted putsch in Spain 
in 1981, but it did not lead the EU to codify the political conditions of 
membership in its treaty at that time. 
 The EU’s use of conditionality with regard to human rights and 
democracy developed significantly in the context of eastern enlargement.  
PHARE aid was provided to post-communist countries only once they had 
achieved progress in democratic transition (which is also the reason why the 
acronym only refers to Poland and Hungary, the frontrunners of 
democratization in ECE).  Conversely, the EU suspended aid for Romania in 
1990 (along with negotiations for a trade agreement), for Yugoslavia in 1991, 
and Croatia in 1995.  The EU also started to apply conditionality to trade 
agreements with post-communist states.  The start of negotiations for the so-
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called “Europe Agreements” reflected differences in democratization across 
ECE.  The EU took one step further in the context of negotiations with 
Romania.  Concerns about democracy in Romania led the EU to discuss the 
inclusion of a suspension clause into the agreement to allow one party to 
terminate the agreement in reaction to violations of democracy and human 
rights in the other party.  However, partly in order to point the finger less 
directly at Romania, the Council agreed in May 1992 that henceforth all 
cooperation and association agreements with CSCE members should contain 
such a suspension clause.  In May 1995, the Council extended the 
suspension clause to agreements with any non-member state.  In addition to 
these expansions of the use of conditionality in the EU’s external relations 
with regard to trade and aid, the European Council in Copenhagen in June 
1993 made a first direct statement of the political conditions for membership.  
The European Council declared for the first time that countries in ECE that so 
desired might eventually become members.  To make this step acceptable to 
the member states that had been reluctant about an eastern enlargement, the 
European Council formulated a number of broad conditions that would-be 
members had to meet.  In addition to the ability to apply EU legislation upon 
accession, a successful transition to a market economy, as well as the EU’s 
own ability to absorb new members, the political conditions specified the need 
for “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities.”10  
 On the basis of these “Copenhagen criteria”, political conditionality 
broadened considerably in its subsequent application by the Commission and 
the European Council.  For example, the Commission’s annual monitoring 
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reports that formed the basis of decisions by the Council about the accession 
process included issues such as language training for non-citizens and prison 
conditions in Latvia, or the conditions of state-run orphanages in Romania.  
An example of how wide-ranging political conditions had become are the 
benchmarks that the Commission identified in 2008 for Macedonia to start 
accession negotiation:  they included improved dialogue with political parties, 
reforms of the police, the legal sector, and of public administration, the fight 
against corruption, and electoral law reform.  The EU’s political conditions are 
generally most extensive with regard to the successor states of Yugoslavia, 
where they include issues related to the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and 
ethnic conflict, such as cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the return of refugees, regional cooperation 
and good neighborly relations, or a ”normalization” of relations between 
Serbia and Kosovo.   
 The scope of the EU’s political conditionality goes far beyond the rules 
covered by the EU treaty and that apply to its member states.  This 
discrepancy has led to accusations of double standards in the treatment of 
candidates and full members.  Partly as a result of the EU’s vulnerability to 
such criticism, partly to increase the leverage of EU institutions over new 
members if democratic standards should slip after accession, the member 
states agreed to strengthen EU competences in these areas.  An amendment 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 stated that ”the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule 
of law” are preconditions for membership.  It also specified procedures to 
suspend membership rights of a country for ”serious and persistent” breaches 
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of these principles (Article 7 TEU).  Yet even with this treaty change, pre-
accession conditionality still extends far beyond the principles codified in the 
EU treaty. 
 
Variation in the EU’s influence on democratization in ECE 
While the EU can be a pervasive force in the domestic politics of 
would-be members, there are also plenty of examples of the limits of the EU’s 
influence.  The EU’s efforts to influence domestic politics continue to have 
little effect in Belarus, just as they were unsuccessful in Slovakia under the 
government of Vladimír Mečiar between 1994 and 1998, in Croatia under 
Franjo Tuđman (1990-99), or in Serbia under Slobodan Milošević (1989-
2000).  At the same time, it is hardly tenable to claim that, say, Poland, 
Hungary or the Czech Republic would not have democratized without the EU.  
How much influence does the EU then have on democratization, and how can 
we explain variation in this influence across different target countries?  
Studies of EU accession conditionality share one main finding, namely 
that its influence depends on a favorable constellation of domestic factors.11  
More specifically, the EU’s influence depends primarily on target 
governments’ cost/benefit calculations in response to the incentives provided 
by the EU.  Moreover, there is also a fairly large consensus on which 
particular factors are most important for such cost/benefit calculations and 
hence for the effectiveness of conditionality:  the size of the EU’s incentives, 
the credibility of the EU’s conditionality, and, crucially, the domestic 
adjustment costs for target governments.12  The first two factors are largely in 
the hands of the EU, while the last one is not; yet it depends precisely on 
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favorable domestic conditions whether a country is susceptible to EU 
influence. 
The main domestic condition are the adjustment costs of compliance 
with EU conditionality for target governments.  These adjustment cost 
generally tend to be higher the lower a country’s starting point with regard to 
prevailing democratic principles.  More specifically, with regard to issues such 
as minority rights, domestic adjustment costs depend on the strength of 
nationalist parties in parliament.13  With regard to democratization, the costs 
entailed in meeting the EU’s demand vary according to domestic party 
constellations, for which the literature distinguishes between liberal, illiberal, 
and mixed party constellations.14  While the adjustment costs were 
prohibitively high in illiberal constellations for the EU to have an influence, in 
liberal constellations, the EU was unnecessary for democratization.  The EU’s 
influence was therefore most significant in mixed constellations. 
 
Democratic frontrunners with liberal party constellations 
The democratic frontrunners in ECE – Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania - generally followed a liberal 
trajectory15 and were characterized by a liberal party constellation in which the 
major parties agreed on liberal reforms and integration into Western 
international organizations.  These countries began to democratize and to 
consolidate democracy without EU pressure and it is highly doubtful that they 
would not have democratized without the EU.  The convergence between 
these governments’ preferences for democratization and EU demands meant 
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that, in these countries, the EU was without much causal influence on the 
broad patterns of democratic development.16 
 At the same time, the EU might still have an impact on specific aspects 
of democracy in these countries - especially with regard to questions of 
minority rights.  Although the adjustment costs in this issue area were still 
considerable, but they were usually not prohibitively high for governments in 
countries with liberal party constellations.  The general agreement on 
democratic principles among the main parties meant that minority rights did 
not threaten the basis on which a government maintained its power.  The 
main examples here are Estonia and Latvia with their sizeable Russophone 
minorities.  In these countries, the EU’s use of conditionality was able to 
overcome even strong domestic opposition and reversed discriminatory 
policies, for example concerning the Latvian citizenship and language laws.  
Conversely, discrimination prevailed in areas where the EU did not make use 
of its conditionality, such as the electoral law and the education law in 
Latvia.17  Examples in other countries range from the adoption of reforms of 
the Czech judicial system to the question of the segregation of the Roma 
population in the Czech town of Usti Nad Labem that the EU raised in 1999, 
or EU criticism of the freedom of the media in Hungary in the early years after 
the fall of communism. 
 
Authoritarian/nationalist governments in illiberal party constellations 
At the other end of the spectrum are countries that were dominated by 
nationalist, authoritarian or populist regimes, or where governments relied on 
authoritarian practices to stay in office.  There are not many countries in ECE 
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in which such regimes have held power uninterruptedly since 1989.  Belarus 
is probably the only case, while in other countries such as Slovakia under 
Mečiar, Croatia under Tuđman, or Serbia under Milošević, 
nationalist/authoritarian regimes were in power only temporarily. 
 In illiberal domestic party constellations, the EU also had very little 
impact on democratization while nationalist or authoritarian elites were in 
power.  For these elites, the political adjustment costs of complying with the 
EU’s requirements with regard to democracy were potentially prohibitively 
high.18  As the EU’s conditions threatened to undermine the very basis of their 
rule, the leadership of such countries was immune to EU pressure.  In the 
case of Belarus under President Aleksander Lukashenko, the EU combined 
the positive incentives of democratic conditionality with sanctions, such as 
breaking off high level political contact between the EU and Belarus in 2004, a 
visa ban and freezing of assets of the country's main leaders, or the 
suspension the Generalized System of Preferences on trade.  Since then 
there have been episodes of an easing of sanctions in response to democratic 
improvements, such as a release of political prisoners in 2008, and peaceful 
elections in 2015, punctuated by a freezing of relations after crackdowns on 
opposition, such as after the presidential election in 2010.  In sum, there has 
been some modest progress, especially after the Lukasheko regime looked 
for a rapprochement in 2017.  As a strategy to diversify economic relations 
away from an exclusive focus on Russia, the regime came to place a higher 
value on closer relations with the EU.  But progress remains limited to areas 
that do not threat to undermine the regime’s hold on office. 
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Fragile democracies with mixed party constellations 
Arguably, the EU’s impact on democratic consolidation was most 
pronounced in those states in which nationalist or authoritarian forces lost 
power to liberal forces, such as in Slovakia (after the September 1998 
elections), Croatia (temporarily, after the January 2000 elections), Serbia 
(temporarily, after the overthrow of Milošević in October 2000 and after the 
July 2008 elections), or Romania (after the November 1996 elections).  Once 
more liberal opposition parties assumed power, the EU’s conditionality – if 
combined with a credible accession perspective – had a lock-in effect that 
endured subsequent changes in government.19  
 For democratic, reform-oriented forces that had been in opposition, the 
compliance costs with regard to the EU’s political conditionality might still 
have been high, but they did not threaten their very power basis.  If these 
forces formed the government and adopted reforms demanded by the EU, 
and the EU rewarded compliance with further steps towards integration, the 
political opportunity structure for subsequent governments changed.  As long 
as the electorate expected benefits from EU membership, future governments 
faced costs if they attempted to roll back the democratic reforms of their 
predecessors and thereby slow down progress on the path to European 
integration.  By the same token, progress towards EU membership through 
democratic reform also created incentives for nationalist parties in opposition 
to moderate their platforms.20  In order to win re-election, they had to reassure 
the electorate that they would not endanger the progress made toward EU 
membership. 
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 Examples of such dynamics include Romania, where democratization 
improved significantly after a reform coalition replaced the first post-
communist government of Ion Iliescu following the 1996 elections, but where 
democratic performance was maintained after Iliescu and his Social 
Democratic Party (PDSR21) returned to power in 2000.  Maybe the clearest 
example is Slovakia, after Mečiar and the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS22) lost the 1998 elections to a broad coalition of liberal 
democratic parties.  The new government, led by Mikuláš Dzurinda, rapidly 
complied with the EU’s democratic conditions that corresponded to its own 
priorities of political reform.  It met the EU’s demands for municipal elections, 
a charter for municipal self-government, direct elections of the president, and 
involvement of opposition parties in parliamentary appointments.  In the area 
of minority rights, it established a parliamentary committee and a government 
council, and passed a law on the use of minority languages, which was the 
last precondition for start accession negotiations with the EU.23  The 2006 
elections brought to power Robert Fico’s Direction – Social Democracy party 
(SMER24), in coalition with the nationalist Slovak National Party and Mečiar’s 
(renamed) People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (L’S 
HZDS25).  However, despite some of the rhetoric, there has not been a 
significant democratic backsliding in practice.26 
 A similar example is Croatia after Tuđman’s death and the defeat of the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ27) in the parliamentary election in 2000.  
The liberal democratic coalition government formed by Ivica Račan made 
strong progress toward starting EU accession negotiations, although some of 
the EU’s conditions still imposed high costs – notably regarding cooperation 
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with the ICTY, which included the extradition of generals indicted for war 
crimes that large parts of the population considered to be heroes.  The HDZ 
returned to power after the 2003 elections, but had moderated its platform 
while in opposition.  It eventually removed the last remaining obstacle to EU 
accession negotiations by cooperating with the ICTY to facilitate the arrest of 
General Ante Gotovina.   
 The key common point in all these examples is that changes in 
democratization patterns in response to EU demands required a prior change 
in government for EU to have an impact.  As Geoffrey Pridham puts it, 
”European designing of democracy follows rather than precedes the 
establishment of and first efforts in creating new liberal democracies.”28 While 
the literature therefore largely agrees that EU influence on democracy 
required prior domestic change, debate persists on whether the EU itself 
played a role in bringing about the electoral defeat of nationalist/authoritarian 
governments.   
 Some authors argue that the EU’s causal influence on national 
elections has been extremely limited.29  In this view, since the EU’s influence 
is limited to the intergovernmental channel, it was powerless when faced with 
an authoritarian/nationalist leadership.  Its inability to mobilize societal actors 
and voters against such governments restricted it to waiting for favorable 
developments in domestic politics that would bring to power liberal democratic 
parties for which the EU’s political conditions did not impose prohibitive costs.  
Rather than EU influence, the outcome of such watershed elections then 
reflected domestic factors, such as party strategies on electoral pacts as in 
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Slovakia’s 1998 election,30 or voter dissatisfaction as in 2000 with the 
Croatian government’s record on the economy and corruption.   
 However, even if the EU did not directly influence voters’ choices and 
the outcome of elections, it might have influenced domestic politics 
indirectly.31  By contributing to the creation of a more competitive political 
systems in illiberal states, it pushed them to a liberal political trajectory.  The 
EU empowered liberal reformers by informing electorates about the 
implication of their choices for the country’s accession prospects.  The EU 
could also influence successful electoral strategies.  It fostered cooperation 
among a hitherto fragmented opposition by providing a common platform.  
The need for a common platform also induced a moderation of opposition 
forces through alignment of their programs with the EU’s agenda of 
democratization.  In this way, the EU also influenced which ideological outlook 
was shared by the elites that won power in watershed elections. 
 Maybe one of the clearest attempts by the EU to influence the outcome 
of key elections is its change of strategy with regard to conditionality vis-à-vis 
Serbia.  The EU initially made the signing of an association agreement 
conditional on full cooperation with the ICTY, which had long been the subject 
of conflict between Vojislav Koštunica, the nationalist president of the 
(Serbian and Montenegrin) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Zoran 
Djindjić, the pro-European Serbian prime minister.  After Djindjić’s 
assassination in March 2003, parliamentary elections at the end of the year 
resulted in a minority government led by Koštunica, which effectively put an 
end to cooperation with the ICTY.  The EU eventually carried out its threat to 
suspend the ongoing negotiations for the association agreement if the Serbian 
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government failed to extradite Bosnian Serb General Radko Mladić to the 
ICTY.  Yet after the pro-European Boris Tadić won re-election in the 
presidential election in January 2008, the EU signed the agreement in April 
(while keeping its implementation conditional on cooperation with the ICTY).  
This move was intended to signal to the electorate the tangible benefits of a 
victory of Tadić’s electoral coalition For a European Serbia (ZES32) in the 
parliamentary elections in May.  Tadić successfully framed the election as a 
referendum on Serbia’s European integration and his electoral bloc won the 
election, which enabled it to form a coalition government.   
The Serbian parliamentary elections of 2008 are an example not only 
of the EU’s influence on national elections, but also of how the government 
change that it brought about can serve to lock-in compliance with its 
conditions.  Since both the presidency and government were now held by pro-
European parties, the Serbian authorities fully cooperated with the ICTY, 
arresting and extraditing the four remaining high-profile Bosnian Serb 
indictees during 2008 and 2011.  Significantly, Serbia stayed the course for 
EU accession even after Tomislav Nikolić, the then deputy leader of the 
nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS33) whom Tadić had narrowly defeated 
in the 2008 presidential election, won both the presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 2012.  In the meantime, Nikolić had formed a break-away party 
from the SRS, the Serbian Progressive Party, in opposition to the staunch 
rejection of EU membership by the SRS leader, Vojislav Šešelj.  Despite 
remaining staunchly opposed to the independence of Kosovo, in view of the 
progress made towards EU accession in the preceding years, Nikolić 
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removed the last remaining obstacle to starting accession negotiations by 
agreeing to ‘normalize’ relations between Serbia and Kosovo. 
 
Variation in EU influence on ECE accession countries and current 
candidate countries in SEE 
The above discussion about variation in the EU’s influence on 
democratization therefore reminds us not to overstate the EU’s influence on 
democratization.  One the one hand, it is typically powerless when faced with 
authoritarian leaderships until domestic change occurs.  On the other hand, 
we must be careful not to attribute all cases of successful democratization to 
the EU’s influence.  At the same time, it was arguably during the period 
leading to the EU’s eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007 that the EU’s 
influence on democratization through conditionality was strongest.  Compared 
to the ECE countries that joined the EU in these enlargement rounds, 
progress with democratization and the establishment of the rule of law has 
been more modest, and the EU’s influence on it more limited, in the current 
candidate countries in SEE since 2007.   
One explanation for this difference – just as for the variation discussed 
in the section above – is that the adjustment costs to the EU’s political 
conditionality are much higher in SEE than they were in CEE.  On the one 
hand, starting conditions in SEE were generally less favorable, with lower 
levels of democratization as SEE countries embarked on post-communist 
transition and/or new statehood.  Higher levels of corruption on average also 
means that governments in SEE have needed to forego more rent-seeking 
opportunities in order to meet the EU’s conditions with regard to the rule of 
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law.  Moreover, the EU’s political conditions were arguably much more 
demanding in SEE, especially in the successor states of Yugoslavia that had 
been involved in violent ethnic conflict.  EU conditions designed to address 
the legacies of the conflict, such as the establishment of good neighborly 
relations or cooperation with the ICTY, went to the core of questions of 
national identity.34  For nationalist governments, this put compliance with EU 
conditions at odds with their core beliefs, while moderate nationalists had to 
fear an electoral backlash that could cost them their office.   
The other main factor that makes EU influence on democratization less 
effective in SEE since 2007 is directly related to how the EU uses 
conditionality:  the credibility of EU conditionality has diminished considerably 
for the countries in SEE compared to those in ECE. 
 
The credibility of membership conditionality until the 2004/07 enlargements  
In general, for the EU’s conditional offer of membership to sway 
domestic cost/benefit calculations in favor of compliance, the offer has to be 
credible.35  Credibility implies both that a target country has to be certain that 
the EU will deliver on awarding the promised benefits, and that these benefits 
will be only delivered in response to compliance with the conditions set.  
Generally, the literature agrees that key elements of a credible conditionality 
are its consistent and merit-based application, as well as unambiguous 
messages from EU actors about what target states need to do in order to 
obtain the reward, and a clear consensus that the reward will be paid out 
when the conditions are met.36  
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 By and large, the EU has applied democratic conditionality fairly 
consistently in the period leading to the 2004/2007 enlargements.  Most 
importantly, this referred to the willingness of the EU to grant membership to 
candidates that met the conditions.  Initially, the reluctant and incremental 
nature with which the EU’s policy on eastern enlargement evolved in the face 
of strong reservations in many EU member states, put the EU’s commitment 
to offering accession into question. 
In view of the doubts in candidate countries about the member states’ 
willingness to enlarge the EU, the main act that made the membership 
perspective credible to candidate countries was the opening of accession 
negotiations.37  Officials in the Commission suggest that opening accession 
negotiations is the most important stage of the enlargement process, 
”because opening them implies a willingness to conclude them.”38  Candidate 
countries often complied with domestically contested issues only in the final 
stages of the accession process, such as in the case of the Latvian election 
law with regard to language requirements for candidates.  When such issues 
were the main remaining stumbling block on the road to membership, it was 
highly credible that compliance would be rewarded with accession.   
The importance of accession negotiations for the credibility of 
conditionality also explains why the candidate countries carried out difficult 
adjustments if the EU made the opening of accession negotiations conditional 
on the fulfillment of specific political conditions.  Examples include the 
cooperation of the Croatian government with the ICTY over the arrest of 
General Gotovina, which had been the main obstacle to the start of 
negotiations, or the revision of the Latvian state language law according to EU 
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demands.  This successful influence was due to the credibility of the promise 
to eventually grant membership in return for compliance. 
Moreover, the EU has been fairly consistent with regard to making 
fulfillment of democratic conditions the precondition for opening accession 
negotiations.  A clear example is the decision by the European Council to 
exclude Slovakia from the group of countries opening accession negotiations 
in 1998 – despite sufficient progress with economic and legal adjustment – 
due the shortcomings of democracy under the Mečiar regime.  Another 
example was the EU’s postponement of opening accession negotiations with 
Croatia that had been scheduled for March 2005.  The postponement resulted 
from the government’s failure to cooperate fully with the ICTY in the arrest of 
General Ante Gotovina, who had been indicted for war crimes during the 
military operations that expelled the Krajina Serbs in 1995.  After the ICTY’s 
then Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, confirmed that the Croatian 
government fully cooperated, the EU opened accession negotiations in 
October 2005 (and Gotovina was arrested in the Spanish Canary Islands in 
December 2005 with the active assistance of Croatian security agencies).39   
While the general consensus in the EU on the potential membership of 
the candidates in CEE was the key aspect that made membership 
conditionality during this period credible, there were some country- and issue-
specific shortcomings in applying conditionality consistently, and these often 
manifested themselves in diminished EU influence.  For example, the decision 
to include Bulgaria and Romania in accession negotiations in 2000 cast 
doubts about the merit-based application of conditionality, since it arguably 
owed more to their support for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, than to their 
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progress with meeting the EU’s conditions.  Questions have also been raised 
whether the EU has been consistent in its criticisms of undemocratic 
practices.  For example, EU representatives did not criticize Sali Berisha’s 
autocratic style and alleged rigging of the 1996 Albanian election due to his 
perceived contribution to maintaining stability in the country.40  Finally, the 
credibility of conditionality in specific issue areas was low if the EU failed to 
make it subject to clear conditionality.  For example, between 1997 and 1999, 
the EU did not attach explicit conditions to changes in Estonia’s controversial 
language requirements for candidates in national elections, in contrast to the 
criticism from the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, as well as 
to the EU’s conditionality with regard to citizenship for stateless children.41  
 An example of the importance of the credibility of the threat of 
exclusion is the case of Cyprus.  The EU’s promise not to make accession 
dependent on the unification of the island was meant to deprive the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership of a de facto veto over Cypriot membership.  Instead, it 
undermined the credibility of any pressures on the Greek Cypriot community 
to compromise over a settlement, leading it to reject the Annan plan for the 
unification of the island.  It was therefore to little avail that the credible threat 
of exclusion worked on the Turkish Cypriot community, which supported the 
plan despite its long-standing resistance to international pressures for doing 
so.   
 
The credibility of membership conditionality after the 2007 enlargement  
 In contrast to the generally high credibility of the EU’s membership 
incentive for the countries joining in 2004/2007, the EU has been significantly 
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weakened its credibility for the remaining accession countries in SEE.  On the 
one hand, the EU was relatively much faster in accepting the countries in SEE 
as potential candidates at an early stage in their accession process in 2003, 
than it had been with ECE countries.  On the other hand, starting from 2005, 
and especially after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and the 
financial crisis of 2008, enlargement fatigue in the EU has diminished the 
credibility of the prospect of further EU enlargement. 
Public opinion on EU enlargement, particularly among the older 
member states, has become more resistant over time.42  Public opposition, 
especially related to labor migration from new members, and a perception that 
the accession of Bulgaria and Romania had been premature in view of the 
persistence of governance problems, especially with corruption, has made 
member state governments more reluctant to consider further enlargement.  
In the European Commission, enlargement has also clearly dropped far down 
the agenda.  The Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, found it 
opportune to state explicitly that no enlargement would take place during his 
presidency (which would have been highly unlikely anyway) and the 
Commission has since abolished the post of a designated Commissioner for 
Enlargement. 
The change in the EU’s commitment to enlargement has been most 
pronounced with regard to Turkey, even before the AKP government’s drift 
toward authoritarianism.  Prior to the opening of negotiations with Turkey in 
2005, some member state governments, particularly in France and Austria, 
argued that negotiations might not necessarily lead to accession, but to 
another form of ”privileged partnership”.  Moreover, subsequent amendments 
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to the French constitution required all EU enlargements (after Croatia) to be 
approved by referendum, or a 3/5 majority of both houses of parliaments 
meeting in congress.  These developments greatly reduce the credibility of the 
EU’s promise to grant accession if Turkey met the conditions, and by 
extension the incentive for the Turkish government to do so.   
While Turkey is the most striking example, the EU’s more cautious 
approach to enlargement has led to a weakening of the membership prospect 
for other current candidate countries in SEE too.  Especially the prospect of 
referenda in current member states about accession means that candidate 
countries cannot be sure that the EU will accept them even if they meet all the 
accession criteria.  This uncertainty has triggered a vicious circle in which the 
EU has lost much leverage over domestic reforms, and a slowdown and even 
reversal of domestic reforms has in turn rendered the prospect of membership 
more remote.  The EU’s diminished commitment to enlargement has affected 
the accession prospects of individual countries differently, depending both on 
the attitudes towards them among the member states and on the specific 
domestic conditions in the candidate country.   
Macedonia is arguably the most striking example of the negative 
impact that the diminished credibility of the membership prospect had on the 
country’s democratization trajectory and the EU’s influence on it.  Initially, 
Macedonia had been among the earlier democratizing countries in the region, 
complying with a number of demanding conditions that led the Commission to 
recommend opening accession negotiations as early as 2009.  However, the 
Greek government blocked this move to gain leverage in the bilateral dispute 
over the use of the name ”Macedonia”.  Repeated Commission 
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recommendations continued to be met by a Greek veto.  The diminished 
prospect of accession negotiations had decreased the EU’s ability to influence 
domestic politics and to counteract a deterioration of democracy and state 
capture, as exposed in the wiretapping scandal in 2015 that led to a 
prolonged political crisis and the fall of the government headed by Nikola 
Gruevski.  The compromise in June 2018 between the two prime ministers on 
the name issue (agreeing to rename Macedonia the Republic of Northern 
Macedonia) has re-opened the prospect of accession negotiations, although 
the agreement still faces a difficult ratification process in Macedonia.  At a 
Council meeting in June 2018, a majority of member states were willing to 
open accession negotiations with Macedonia (and Albania), in view of their 
progress with improving the rule of law and fighting organized crime.  But 
especially due to opposition from The Netherlands and France, they only 
agreed to do so by the end of 2019, depending on further progress in the two 
countries.43  
Montenegro and Serbia are both involved in accession negotiations 
(since 2012 and 2014 respectively).  Serbia especially made the politically 
difficult steps of arresting and extraditing indicted (Bosnian) Serb war 
criminals to the ICTY and of ”normalizing” up to a point relations with Kosovo 
in order to start accession negotiations.  Yet while both countries have made 
some modest progress with democratic governance, it has been slow.  In both 
countries, progress has recently stagnated or even deteriorated as the 
credibility of EU accession diminished.  Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo – 
the latter has not been recognized by all EU member states -- show not only 
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the limits of the EU’s influence on democratization, but also a failure of EU 
state-building through conditionality.44  
The exception to the vicious circle of diminished credibility of accession 
conditionality, reduced EU influence on domestic change, and a deterioration 
of democratization in SEE is Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013.  The HDZ 
government complied with the EU’s requirement to cooperate with the ICTY in 
the arrest of General Gotovina to start accession negotiations.  It then 
demonstrated its determination to fight corruption – an EU priority for closing 
negotiations – by arresting Ivo Sanader, who had served as Prime Minister 
from 2003 to 2009, on corruption charges, leading to a prison sentence in 
2012.   
 
The sustainability of the EU’s influence on democratization after 
accession 
The EU’s influence on democratization was thus generally much 
stronger on the countries in ECE that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 than in 
the current candidate countries.  Yet there are signs that, even among these 
countries, the EU’s influence on democratization may not be sustainable after 
they have obtained EU membership.  Locking in democratic change through 
the incentive of EU membership always entailed the risk of a reversal once 
accession was achieved.45  Early studies found little evidence to support this 
concern during the first half decade of EU membership of post-communist 
countries.46  Over the course of the years since 2010, however, the picture 
has changed significantly.  The two dramatic examples of democratic 
backsliding are Hungary under the Fidesz government (since 2010) and 
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Poland under the Law and Justice (PiS47) government (since 2015).  How 
effective is the EU in preventing a consolidation of illiberalism in these 
countries? 
 
Democratic backsliding in the EU’s new member states 
In Hungary, Fidesz won the 2010 parliamentary election with 52.73 
percent of the vote, which was sufficient for a supermajority of 2/3 of the seats 
in parliament allowing that party to change the constitution without the support 
of any other party.  What followed is an unprecedented concentration of 
power in the hands of Victor Orbán’s government.48  Through constitutional 
and legislative changes as well as a packing of (para)public institutions with 
party loyalists, Fidesz eliminated checks and balances.  It suspended the 
independence of the judiciary, curbed the role of the constitutional court, 
eliminated pluralism and independence of the media, and changed the 
electoral system to ensure supermajorities in subsequent elections against a 
fragmented opposition.  Orbán’s self-declared creation of an ”illiberal 
democracy” followed a novel strategy of suspending liberal democratic 
principles without formally breaking the law.  The unique opportunity offered 
by the constitution-changing majority enabled Fidesz to pursue an ingenious 
strategy of creating an illiberal ”Frankenstate”49 – individual components of 
which do not obviously fall short of formal democratic criteria and may be 
justified with similar practices elsewhere, but in their sum undermine liberal 
democratic pluralism most fundamentally. 
In Poland, the national-conservative PiS won an absolute majority in 
the parliamentary elections in October 2015 with 37.58 percent of the vote.  
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Yet despite lacking the constitution-changing majority that Fidesz had in 
Hungary, it pursued a very similar strategy of concentrating power by 
establishing government control over the judiciary and curbing the 
independence of the media.50  
Finally, a more straightforward case of a serious violation of the rule of 
law occurred in Romania, although it remained largely a temporary episode.  
In 2012, a new government coalition, led by Victor Ponta’s Social Democratic 
Party (PSD51) committed various breaches of the rule of law in attempting to 
impeachment Ponta’s party-political rival, the center-right president Traian 
Basescu.52  These measures included an unconstitutional use of emergency 
ordinances, curbing the powers of the constitutional court and changing the 
constitutional requirement of a 50 percent turnout in the referendum that had 
to confirm the impeachment. 
 
The scope and limits of the EU’s ability to redress democratic backsliding 
The EU has been not only been unable to prevent these breaches of 
liberal democratic governance from occurring in the first place.  It has also 
proved largely unable to continuing acting as a force for democratization after 
accession by redressing democratic backsliding.53  In the case of Hungary, 
the EU has been generally very slow even in criticizing the Hungarian 
government openly and has only recently started to consider taking action.  
So far, it has only had been able to influence domestic changes to reverse 
illiberal policies in the margins.  In Poland, EU institutions have been faster 
and more active in reacting to the breaches of liberal democracy by the PiS 
government, but also have not been able to exercise much influence so far.  
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One exception to this bleak picture is the case of Romania.54  The Romanian 
government broadly complied with a list of demands by the EU to redress its 
breaches of the rule of law.  The limited influence of the EU can be explained 
by the limited credibility of the EU’s (negative) incentives, while differences in 
adjustment costs explain the main variation of EU influence across the 
country cases. 
Prior to accession, the success of EU conditionality in supporting 
democratization depended both on its ability to offer a sufficiently large 
incentive – EU accession – to overcome domestic adjustment costs, and on 
the credibility of this incentive.  After accession, the EU can no longer offer 
(equally sizeable) positive incentives for continued compliance with liberal 
democratic norms, but it can threaten sanctions.  Again, these negative 
incentives also have to be credible, and arguably this is precisely the 
weakness of the post-accession incentive structure with regard to protecting 
liberal democracy. 
Although the incentives that the EU can offer for compliance with its 
liberal democratic rules are much stronger prior to accession than after 
accession, EU institutions nonetheless can use potentially far-reaching 
sanctions with regard to violations of liberal democracy.  Article 7 TEU allows 
the Council to ”suspend certain … rights” of a member state for ‘serious and 
persistent’ breaches.  The problem is that the credibility of the threat of 
sanctions is low.  The credibility of EU sanctions depends largely on the 
autonomy of EU institutions, such as the Commission, the European 
Parliament (EP), and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in triggering their 
imposition.  However, this autonomy is extremely limited, as it is the member 
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states themselves who determine by unanimity (minus one) whether such a 
breach has occurred.  The Hungarian government has already reassured the 
Polish government that it would use its veto to prevent the determination of a 
violation in Poland.  Moreover, the ability of the EP to play a role in triggering 
the Article 7 procedure, or even simply to criticize illiberal governments, has 
been curtailed by party politics.55  The European Peoples Party (EPP), the 
political group of the EP in which Fidesz is a member, has largely shielded the 
Hungarian government from criticism.  At the same time, however, the Polish 
PiS, as a member of the much smaller European Conservatives and 
Reformists group and a partisan rival of the EPP, has been more vulnerable 
to sanctions in the EP.  Still, the high threshold for triggering Article 7 and the 
high degree of control of member states greatly diminish the threat of 
sanctions, even if they are potentially very strong.   
The credibility of sanctions also explains why the EU was more 
successful when it attempted to influence illiberal practices in Hungary in 
specific issue areas that had a separate basis in secondary EU legislation.  In 
these areas, Articles 258 and 260 TFEU give EU institutions high autonomy in 
imposing sanctions: the Commission can launch infringement procedures 
independently and the ECJ can ultimately impose financial penalties against 
persistent non-compliance.  In January 2012, the Commission started 
infringement procedures against Hungarian legislation in three areas:  the 
lowering of the retirement age of judges from 70 to 62 (used to replace a 
generation of judges with new party-loyal judges, and which infringes the EU’s 
directive on equal treatment in employment), as well as measures to restrict 
the independence of the national data protection supervisory authority, and of 
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the Hungarian Central Bank respectively.  The compliance process was still 
drawn out and the Commission’s victory in this case may well have been 
pyrrhic as the political damage had been done by then (judges forced into 
retirement were typically compensated, but not reinstated).  But these cases 
demonstrates that with credible material sanctions, EU institutions can 
maintain some leverage over specific aspects of democratic practice in the 
member states. 
While the limited credibility of the EU’s negative incentives explains 
well its general weakness in addressing backsliding after accession, 
differences in the domestic adjustment costs explain the contrast between its 
failure in Hungary and Poland, and its qualified success in the Romania case.  
In both Hungary and Poland, the fundamental transformation of the system of 
checks and balances constituted the very basis for the government to 
exercise power and to retain office.  Concessions to the EU would 
fundamentally undermine the governments’ ability to continue to do so.  By 
contrast, the Romanian government broke the rule of law to impeach a deeply 
unpopular president who was in any case unlikely to win re-election in the 
following year.  These measures were therefore hardly necessary to maintain 
or win office.  Compliance with the EU’s demands was then far less costly 
than in Hungary or Poland.  In other words, the EU’s ability to counteract 
violations of democratic practices decreases the more serious they are.56  
While differences in adjustment costs to the EU’s explain well the 
differences in EU influence across these cases, it might appear surprising that 
the Romanian government complied at all with the EU’s demands, given the 
credibility deficit of sanctions.  Even if the costs of compliance were not 
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prohibitively high, why comply at all if sanctions are unlikely and non-
compliance offers strategic advantages against political opponents?  One 
possible explanation is that under the right conditions, social pressure might 
be able to allow EU institutions to continue to influence democratization in 
member states.57  In the case of the Ponta government, the conditions were 
strongly conducive for the effective use of social pressure.  First, in contrast to 
the Hungarian case for example, the EU enjoys a high legitimacy both with 
the broader public and the main political parties, including Ponta’s SDL.  This 
strong legitimacy made the Romanian government more susceptible to 
criticism from the EU’s interventions, even if it wasn’t backed up with material 
sanctions.  Second, the (then) 39-year old Ponta was a relative novice to 
international diplomacy, which arguably made him more vulnerable to social 
punishment.  Finally, as mentioned above, the political costs of compliance 
were not too high.  While the EU’s ability to continue to influence 
democratization in its member states might be severely limited, there is at 
least some hope that under certain – admittedly very demanding – conditions, 
it can still have a some influence. 
 
Conclusions  
The conditional promise of EU membership has been a powerful tool 
for the European Union to promote democratization in Central and 
Southeastern Europe since 1989.  At the same time, the influence of the EU 
has varied considerably over time, across issues, and across countries.  The 
influence of conditionality has depended on the EU’s ability to offer a credible 
membership incentive to outweigh the domestic costs of compliance with the 
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EU’s conditions.  Its influence therefore depended crucially on favorable 
domestic constellations.  The EU had only a very limited impact in countries 
with authoritarian and nationalist leaderships whose hold on power was 
threatened by the EU’s demands.  It had its most significant impact once such 
governments were replaced by reform-oriented parties for which compliance 
was less costly.  In these cases, the EU facilitated a lock-in of democratic 
reforms even after a subsequent reversal in government.   
The leverage of EU institutions decreased after most of the countries in 
ECE achieved EU membership in 2004 and 2007, since the sanctions at the 
disposal of EU institutions to punish democratic backsliding lacked credibility.  
The EU has been therefore largely impotent when faced with the measures 
taken by the governments in Hungary and Poland to concentrate power and 
to consolidate illiberal democracies.   
Moreover, the power of EU conditionality in the remaining candidate 
countries in Southeastern Europe appears much more limited than in ECE.  
On the one hand, the domestic circumstances in SEE are generally less 
favorable.  More severe problems with corruption and state capture, as well 
as political conditions that affect sensitive questions of statehood and national 
identity make compliance with EU conditions more costly for elites.  On the 
other hand, the credibility of the membership perspective has suffered from 
signs of an enlargement fatigue in the EU after the 2007 enlargement, which 
in turn has led to diminished efforts in SEE to meet the EU’s political 
conditions.  As EU membership has lost its ability to serve as a focal point for 
democratic reforms, signs of stagnation and democratic backsliding have 
become apparent. 
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 Thus, the EU faces a number of challenges if it wants to continue to 
play as important a role in promoting democratization in the remaining 
candidate countries of Southeastern Europe and among its member states as 
it had played in some of the then candidate countries of ECE.  With regard to 
SEE, if the EU wants to continue using conditionality as an instrument of 
democratization, it needs to offer membership unambiguously if the conditions 
are met.  With regard to democratic practices within its membership, the EU 
needs to strengthen its instruments to sanction non-compliance with regard to 
liberal democracy, and show greater determination to use existing 
instruments, and to use them consistently. 
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